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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
FROM THE SUPREME COURT
BROWN ET AL. V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA
ET AL.*
No. 1. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
Argued December 9, 1952.-Reargued December 8, 1953.-
Decided May 17, 1954.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of
the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on
different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal
question justifies their consideration together in this
consolidated opinion.1
* 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1. In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children
of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States
District court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which
permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate
school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant
to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary
schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated
basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found
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that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but
denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with
respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98
F. Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both
elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin
enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the
segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, § 7; S. C. Code
§ 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and
2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to
the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the
facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the
plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529.
This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of
obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress
made in the equalization program. 342 U. S. 350. On remand, the District Court found that
substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were
proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on
direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children
of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of
provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of
Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., § 140; Va. Code § 22-221 (1950). The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the
requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and
transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula
and transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove"
the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the
validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools
during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under
28 U. S. C. §1253.
In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both
elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action in
the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in
public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, § 2; Del. Rev. Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor
gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools
previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were
inferior with respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities,
physical plant, and time and distance involved in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The chancellor also
found that segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10,
infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id. at 865. The Chancellor's decree was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants
might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and
white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only
that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro
plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted,
344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.
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In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through
their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a
nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they have been denied
admission to schools attended by white children under laws
requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each
of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal
district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called
"separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of
treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially
equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the
Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that
doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white
schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are
not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the
obvious imgortance of the question presented, the Court took
jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and
reargument was heard this Term on certain questions
propounded by the Court.3
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in
Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in
racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of
the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation
convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best,
they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War
Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to
both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished
2. 344 U. S. 1, 141, 891.
3. 345 U. S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms
as amicus curiae.
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them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress
and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with
any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the
Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the
status of public education at that time.4 In the South, the
movement toward free common schools, supported by general
taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children
was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes
was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were
illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by
law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have
achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as
in the business and professional world. It is true that public
school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced
further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on
Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional
debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education
did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was
usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural
areas; the school term was but three months a year in many
states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually
unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there
should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
relating to its intended affect on public education.
4. For a general study of the development of public education prior to the
Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953),
Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School
practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in
Butts and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight,
Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially
the same pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not
begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The
reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South (e.g., the rural character of the
South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in
Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the
War virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id, at 427-428. The low status of
Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War,
is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-
132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws
were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.
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In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth
Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court
interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations
against the Negro race.5 The doctrine of "separate but equal" did
not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. 6 American courts have since labored with the
doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been
six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field
of public education.7 In Cumming v. County Board of Education,
175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity
of the doctrine itself was not challenged.8 In more recent cases,
all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that
specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to
Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U. S. 303, 307-308 (1880):
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored
or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that
no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The
words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,-
the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored,--exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race."
See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-
345 (1880).
6. The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206
(1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state
constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated
in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public
education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such
segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.
7. See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
8. In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant
school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the board
resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case,
the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had
misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend
a Negro school.
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ex rel. Gains v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332
U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases
was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the
Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court
expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v.
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented.
Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the
Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are
being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"
factors.9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white
schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to
the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back
to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
9. In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors.
98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants
were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree." 103 F.
Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program
was already "afoot and progressing" (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been
advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now
been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's
equalization program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.
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doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may
be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law
school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make
for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to
a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again
resorted to intangible considerations: "...his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students,
and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations
apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To
separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this
separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by
a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt
compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has detrimental effect upon the colored children.
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated
school system.' ' 0
10. A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I conclude from the testimony
that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the
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Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply
supported by modem authority.' Any language in Plessy v.
Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold
that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition
makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation
also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12
Because these are class actions, because of the wide
applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of
local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases
presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument,
the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily
subordinated to the primary question-the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that
such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in
formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and
the parties are requested to present further argument on
Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the
reargument this Term. 13 The Attorney General of the United
Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially
inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated." 87 A. 2d 862,
865.
11. K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.
Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under
Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld,
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (Maclver, ed., 1949), 44-48;
Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An
American Dilemma (1944).
12. See Boiling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
13. "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment
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States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of
the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education
will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to
do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by
October 1, 1954.14
It is so ordered.
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by
normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to
schools of their choice, or
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on
color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b),
"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees;
"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?"
14. See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).

